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How do humans come to acquire shared expectations about how they ought to behave
in distinct normalized social settings? This paper offers a normative framework to
answer this question. We introduce the computational construct of ‘deontic value’ –
based on active inference and Markov decision processes – to formalize conceptions
of social conformity and human decision-making. Deontic value is an attribute of
choices, behaviors, or action sequences that inherit directly from deontic cues in our
econiche (e.g., red traffic lights); namely, cues that denote an obligatory social rule.
Crucially, the prosocial aspect of deontic value rests upon a particular form of circular
causality: deontic cues exist in the environment in virtue of the environment being
modified by repeated actions, while action itself is contingent upon the deontic value
of environmental cues. We argue that this construction of deontic cues enables the
epistemic (i.e., information-seeking) and pragmatic (i.e., goal- seeking) values of any
behavior to be ‘cached’ or ‘outsourced’ to the environment, where the environment
effectively ‘learns’ about the behavior of its denizens. We describe the process
whereby this particular aspect of value enables learning of habitual behavior over
neurodevelopmental and transgenerational timescales.
Keywords: active inference, Markov decision process, social conformity, decision-making, deonticity, niche
construction theory
INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A MECHANISTIC VIEW OF
REGIMES OF EXPECTATIONS
The theory of regimes of expectations (ROEs, see section “Glossary”) integrates research in
cognitive psychology, theoretical neuroscience, and evolutionary and cognitive anthropology,
to provide a novel perspective on longstanding questions about fundamental human social
behaviors, such as the uniquely human propensity to cooperate, share intentions, and to coordinate
action, enabling group decisions based on shared goals (Ramstead et al., 2016; Veissière, 2016;
Veissière and Stendel, 2018).
A ROE is a set of expectations about states of the world characteristic of a given cultural
group. Individual agents acquire ROEs in ontogeny through the selective patterning of attention
and salience (Roepstorff et al., 2010; Tomasello, 2014), by leveraging shared expectations (often
automatically and implicitly) to guide goal-directed behavior. Such practices lead agents to forage
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for information that is culturally marked as salient, which in
turn resolves uncertainty about the world and underwrites the
learning of context-specific expectations (e.g., preferences) that
constitute a ROE (Tomasello et al., 2005; Ramstead et al., 2016).
ROEs and Social Conformity
In social psychology, the notion of social conformity was
originally formulated as deference to the socially approved norm
(Asch, 1955) and was viewed as one possible response to social
influence (Asch, 1956). Cultural evolutionary models of social
conformity, in turn, emphasize the fitness-enhancing function
of social conformity (for a review see Morgan and Laland,
2012). On this view, social conformity depends on a series
of evolved dispositions to forage for social information; i.e.,
information acquired through social influence (Kendal et al.,
2018). Examples of such dispositions include the tendency
to allocate attention to agents marked as socially relevant
and the tendency to copy and imitate these agents (Boyd
and Richerson, 1988; Henrich, 2015; for reviews see Laland,
2018), e.g., people who elicit epistemic trust (Fonagy and
Allison, 2014). Social conformity is cast as a learning strategy
effective in uncertain environments, one allowing individuals,
especially naive newcomers, to zero in on the locally adaptive
behavior. Cultural evolutionary theory thereby operates a shift
in the study of social conformity, from the study of external
influences on conformity (e.g., normative conformity), to the
study of conformity as an adaptive strategy to cope with
uncertain environments.
Regimes of expectations are the set of expectations to
which we implicitly appeal when we ask ourselves the
question ‘what should one do?’ in context; where ‘one’
can be viewed as a ‘generalized other,’ understood as the
internalized attitudes and dispositions that are characteristic
of a given community (Mead, 1934). ROEs may be useful to
explain social conformity by producing automatic behavioral
responses in high-order, rule-governed contexts (explaining,
e.g., why some people stop or do not stop at a red traffic
light at 4 AM with no one around). This is because ROEs
prescribe typical, admitted forms of social behavior that include
one’s own attitude, as a member of that community, along
with preferences, values, goals, etc., that are characteristic
of that community.
Preferences constitute, in part, the ‘cultural’ affordances (i.e.,
set of action possibilities that are relevant and available to an
agent, Gibson, 1979; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014) that are
learned implicitly through natural pedagogy (Csibra and Gergely,
2011), by inferring what the authoritative, trusted, prestige-laden
others from one’s in-group would expect one to do in a relevant
situation; e.g., ‘what would mother want me to do?’ (Henrich
and Gil-White, 2001). Environmental cues indicating prestige
can be described as possessing epistemic authority (see section
“Glossary”), acquired via inferences about actual and generalized
agents who might enforce their normative or deontic status.
Receptivity to such environment cues rests on evolved biases
for cultural learning, which allow humans to be unusually and
effortlessly skilled at zooming in on salient, contextually relevant
cues with high normative or deontic value.
ROEs and Human Decisions Making
The concept of ROE is also useful to account for human decision-
making (see section “Glossary”). Humans have a marked
propensity to attend to each other’s actions to figure out ‘what
would a typical other do,’ even when this is maladaptive or
irrational (Cook et al., 2011; Belot et al., 2013; Naber et al.,
2013). Humans are highly skilled at outsourcing their decision-
making and reasoning to trusted, ‘prestigious’ others they have
come to associate with epistemic authority. Listening to a
charismatic, trusted religious figure known to have “healing
abilities,” for example, has been shown in experimental settings
to inhibit frontal executive brain function in religious Christians
(Schjoedt et al., 2011).
The presence of authoritative others has been documented
to guide automatic decision making through a process that
cognitive anthropologists call credibility enhancing displays
(Norenzayan et al., 2016). While it may present a challenge
to verify empirically, recent ‘interactionist’ accounts of the
social nature of solitary reasoning (Mercier and Sperber, 2017)
strongly suggest that automatic and deliberate decision-making
are underwritten by the (implicit and explicit) outsourcing of
culturally-appropriate modes of action-readiness to actual and
generalized others.
Outline of the Argument
Expectations that make up a given regime of expectations (ROE)
are realized or instantiated through properties that are both
internal (i.e., encoded in the brain) and external (i.e., encoded
in the environment) to the agent (Badcock, 2012; Constant
et al., 2018a,b; Badcock et al., 2019; Ramstead et al., 2019a,b).
For instance, the expectations that drive appraisal at a traffic
light include individually learnt, brain-based expectations (e.g.,
knowing how to drive, having learned the traffic laws), as well
as on material cues in the environment, such as traffic lights,
the presence of other pedestrians, cars, etc. Hence, ROEs are
“encoded in multiple levels and sites: in the hierarchical neural
networks, in the organism’s phenotype [...], and in patterned
sociocultural practices and designer environments” (Ramstead
et al., 2016, p. 17). However, the theory of ROEs still lacks a
proper formal (i.e., computational) basis. This renders the theory
of ROEs difficult to implement in empirical studies of phenomena
to which it naturally lands itself, such as social conformity and
human decision making.
In this paper, we describe a formal model of ROEs that
could be used to systematize and study human social conformity
and decision-making. In §2 we base our model on the
active inference scheme (see section “Glossary”) in theoretical
neuroscience (Friston, 2005; Friston et al., 2017a), as applied
to adaptive behavior and navigation in (discrete state space)
environments (Kaplan and Friston, 2018)1. Active inference is
akin to traditional reinforcement learning schemes that aim
to optimize behavior as a function value, reward, or utility
1The terminology and formalism used in this paper refers to the Markovian
interpretation of active inference. We refer both conceptually and technically
minded readers who are unfamiliar with the relation between Markov decision
processes and active inference to Friston et al. (2012) comprehensive introduction.
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maximization (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). However, in active
inference, this optimization is done with respect, not to utility,
but rather to some (Bayesian) beliefs, or expectations that the
agent entertains about its environment. This process involves
various internal computations and action-perception cycles, as
well as environment modifying actions (Bruineberg et al., 2018;
Constant et al., 2018b). Hence, active inference naturally lands
itself as a suitable computational framework for describing ROEs.
In §3, the mathematical formalism of active inference is
applied to the theory of ROEs to show that social conformity and
human collaborative decision making naturally follow from the
individual optimization of Bayesian expectations (e.g., learning,
or model fitting) and from the enactment of those expectations
via environment-modifying actions that leave durable and
informative traces (e.g., deontic cues) in the shared econiche.
This entails a circular causality between the internalization of
‘shared’ Bayesian expectations via social learning, individual
policy selection and decision making, and the implicit production
of cues that support social conformity and the internalization of
shared expectations back again.
AN ACTIVE INFERENCE MODEL OF
REGIMES OF EXPECTATIONS
Active inference speaks to earlier Kantian and Cartesian
ideas about how we navigate our worlds phenomenally, by
encountering it as it appears to our senses and cognitive
architecture. These ideas can be traced through psychology, via
analysis by synthesis (Yuille and Kersten, 2006), perception as
hypothesis testing (Gregory, 1980), epistemological automata
(MacKay, 1956), and action-perception cycles (Dayan et al., 1995;
Friston et al., 2013). Contemporary formulations (including the
one presented here) emphasize the roots of active inference in
American pragmatism and ecological psychology (e.g., Dewey
and Gibson); frameworks in which perception is cast as a means
for behavior; which, in turn, rests heavily on the leveraging
of information directly perceivable in the environment (e.g.,
affordances) (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Ramstead et al.,
2016; Constant et al., 2018b).
Adaptive agents like humans tend to alter their behavior when
they find themselves in surprising situations. For example, as
one stirs one’s cooking pasta, and water spills, one spontaneously
moves one’s hand away to avoid (unwanted burning sensations).
This corresponds to the avoidance of sensory states that provide
sensory evidence against one’s expectations about the integrity
of your body. While one’s reflexes turn out to fulfill one’s
expectations about preferred and typical bodily states, and in so
doing generate evidence for those same expectations, the pre-
emptive withdrawal of one’s hand avoids surprises in the future.
The action that was selected was determined by the sorts of
sensations expected with or without an avoidance maneuvre.
According to active inference, expectations are continuously
updated according to Bayesian principles that underlie perceptual
synthesis; namely, attention and perception (Helmholtz, 1962;
Dayan et al., 1995; Kersten et al., 2004; Knill and Pouget, 2004;
Yuille and Kersten, 2006; Hohwy, 2016; Palacios et al., 2017).
Active inference assumes that adaptive behavior can be described
as realizing the predictions of a generative model (see section
“Glossary”) of the agent’s ongoing sensorimotor engagement
with its environment. Here, states of the environment define a
generative process (see section “Glossary”), which refers to the
dependencies among true states of the world and observations
(Figure 1). The generative model is an internal probabilistic
model of the causal factors that generate the agent’s sensory
observations, now and in the future. The generative model is
used by the agent to select actions that maximize the Bayesian
model evidence (see section “Glossary”) expected under the
agent’s generative model; or equivalently, to minimize the
expected surprise or uncertainty about outcomes (Friston, 2013;
for a discussion of biological plausibility, see Friston et al.,
2010). The mathematical details of active inference may look
complicated; however, they follow in a straightforward way from
a generic model of any world that can be cast in terms of
discrete states. For completeness, we will briefly describe the
mathematical formalism behind active inference and the implicit
belief updating, noting that these details do not change with the
domain of application – and are not necessary to understand
the basic ideas.
The relationship between the generative model and the
generative process is that the agent learns or finesses its
expectations about the states of the generative process based on
the sensory observations it samples – as it navigates the world
and selects policies (i.e., sequences of actions) as a function of
its newly updated expectations. Crucially, these expectations are
grounded by prior beliefs: if an agent expects to encounter green
locations, then it will learn the parameters of the generative
model accordingly, to approach green locations – and policy
selection will be geared toward sampling evidence consistent with
expectations about outcomes, in the fashion of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. In short, it will look as if the agent prefers green
locations if, and only if, the environment (generative process) can
fulfill these expectations.
Policy Selection
Reinforcement learning schemes and other similar utilitarian
formulations face a glaring problem as an account of human
choice behavior. Although uncertainty gets into the game via
constructs like Bayesian decision theory (Daw et al., 2005; Colas
et al., 2010; Solway and Botvinick, 2012), utilitarian formulations
miss the point that the resolution of uncertainty is, in and of itself,
valuable (Howard, 1966). In other words, there is an intrinsic
motivation for everything we do that is completely independent
of expected utility (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Barto et al., 2013).
This intrinsic motivation underwrites epistemic foraging, and the
fundamental drives for an embodied engagement with the world.
For example, most of our choices are driven by their epistemic
affordance or ability to resolve uncertainty about states of
affairs in the world; for instance, ‘what would happen if I
did that?’ (Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007; Schmidhuber, 2010).
This resolution of uncertainty is a prerequisite to any behavior
that can be adequately described in terms of maximizing
expected utility. On this view, expected utility theory and its
psychological concomitants (such as reinforcement learning)
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FIGURE 1 | Generative model for discrete state-space navigation. The above graphical model shows the relations among the different quantities involved in action
policy selection. We refer the reader to Friston et al. (2015) for a detailed discussion of these quantities, update rules, and for the variational Bayesian method used
to update the approximate posterior. The generative model specifies the agent-environment relation in terms of a joint probability P(o,s,pi,A). Blue circles contain the
quantities known by the agent, the green circles contain the quantities that must be inferred; namely, the action policy, the states of the world that generate
observations, and future states upon which observations depend. The orange circle represents an observation. The generative model comprises a likelihood and
prior over states, policies, and parameters. The observation matrix A specifies the likelihood of outcomes under each state of the world. Here, each location in an
8x8 world where the Markov decision process, takes place (shown for illustrative purposes, as gray dashed grid). The agent acts by changing its state (i.e., from
sτ−1 to sτ ), which depends on the selected policy pi. The most likely or valuable policies are those that minimize expected free energy G, which depends on C – a cost
function that attributes a prior cost, when the agent encounters surprising states, say, encountering red locations. C implements pragmatic value discussed in the
main text. D refers to the prior expectations about the starting location, and Cat and Dir refer to the form of the distribution (categorical or Dirichlet). The transition
matrix, or prior beliefs about transitions, B encoded the possible transitions that can be engaged by the agent, given its allowable policies. A policy corresponds to a
sequence of actions; for example, going up, down, left, right, stay. In the above figure, the agent is at sτ−1, and has to infer the policy, say, to reach sτ .
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 679
fpsyg-10-00679 April 1, 2019 Time: 14:22 # 5
Constant et al. Active Inference in Social Life
could be viewed as the legacy of behaviorism that predominated
in the early 20th century.
In active inference, policy selection not only requires Bayesian
belief updating; it also entails the imperatives for action. In brief,
actions are considered more likely if they maximize the evidence
expected under the consequences of that action. Mathematically,
this means selecting actions that optimize expected free energy.
This expected free energy comprises different terms, such
that action policy selection depends on: (i) the potential for
information gain about future states of the world (i.e., epistemic
value or affordance), and (ii) to potential for fulfilling preferred
sensory outcomes (i.e., pragmatic value or affordance).
Here, the generative model that is used to study adaptive
behavior under active inference has a ‘Markovian’ form, in the
sense that it explains navigation and observations as a function
of state transitions in a Markov decision process (MDP) (cf.
Figure 1). The environment in which the MDP unfolds is the
generative process; i.e., how unobserved states of the world
generate observations: e.g., one’s position in an 8x8 grid world
and a visual feature that would be sampled at that location,
say red or green. In this simple example, the generative process
could generate (exteroceptive) outcomes that could be red or
green and (proprioceptive) sensations that could signal some
location information.
Active inference describes how these sensory observations
are used to infer the true causes of sensations (i.e., location
and color) – and how to actively sample this world to reduce
uncertainty and realize prior preferences. Selecting optimal
policies under Markovian models rests on evaluating expected
variational free energy (see section “Glossary”) (Elfwing et al.,
2016; Mirza et al., 2016). This quantity involves the expectations
and preferences contained within the generative model. The
expected variational free energy G of a policy pi at time τ can be
expressed as:
G (pi, τ) =
EQ˜
[
ln Q (A)− ln Q (A|sτ, oτ,pi)
]+ EQ˜ [ln Q (sτ|pi)− ln Q (sτ|oτ,pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Epistemic value (state and paramters)
−EQ˜
[
ln p(ot)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pragmatic value
(1)
Where:
Q˜ = Q(oτ, sτ,A|pi) = P(oτ|sτ)Q(sτ|pi)Q(A)
Q˜ is a counterfactual (‘what if ’) posterior distribution over
hidden states of the world sτ at time τ expected by the agent,
yet to be received observations oτ, and the parameters of the
likelihood matrix A that contains expectations about outcomes
given states of the world (e.g., greenness or redness of a particular
location). In short, what is important for us is that under
active inference (and discrete generative models), policies are
selected as a function of expected free energy G, which comprises
counterfactual expectations EQ˜ about what would happen if one
were to enact a given policy pi : i.e., ‘what observation oτ I
would make’ and ‘at what state sτ I would be in.’ The epistemic
value contains the expected information gain (i.e., uncertainty
reduction) afforded a policy with respect to contingencies in the
world (i.e., novelty), and the expected uncertainty reduction with
respect to states of the world (i.e., salience) (Kaplan and Friston,
2018). Finally, the pragmatic value just is the value of a policy
with respect to its potential of fulfilling preferred outcomes (i.e.,
potential for supplying expected sensory states).
This means that action is driven by expectations about ‘where
I should be’ and ‘what I should perceive’ given some allowable
actions. These expectations depend on the extent to which my
observations will resolve uncertainty about the context ‘I find
myself in’ and, at the same time, are consistent with the outcomes
‘someone like me’ would expect to encounter. In this setting,
epistemic value is variously known as intrinsic motivation,
Bayesian surprise, information gain or the value of information
(Deci and Ryan, 1985; Schmidhuber, 2006, 2010; Oudeyer and
Kaplan, 2007; Itti and Baldi, 2009; Barto et al., 2013). Conversely,
pragmatic value is formally identical to utility or reward in
economics and reinforcement learning (Ortega and Braun, 2011;
Pearson et al., 2014; Bossaerts and Murawski, 2015).
Policy selection balances the pragmatic and epistemic
affordance of action; namely, the extent to which the
consequences of an action conform to the agent’s preferences
(e.g., say, encountering green locations), and minimize
uncertainty about the states of the world (e.g., its location).
This amounts to the maximization of the pragmatic and
epistemic values of action, which are associated with goal-
seeking behavior and information seeking uncertainty-reducing
behavior, respectively. The latter can also be construed as the
epistemic affordance that underwrites curiosity and novelty
seeking (Schmidhuber, 2010; Friston et al., 2015; Friston et al.,
2017b; Kaplan and Friston, 2018).
A DEEP Active Inference Model for ROEs
While the epistemic and pragmatic values depend on
expectations about ‘what I should perceive’ and ‘where I
should be’ under all plausible actions, the deontic value (or
deontic affordance) of action relates to shared expectations;
namely, expectations about ‘what one should do’ in a given
situation – in other words, the most likely action that a typical
agent (like me) would perform in a given setting. This allows
for the tuning of one’s behavior to the expectations of others
(usually, others like me) (Baker et al., 2011; Palmer et al., 2015),
which may be broadly associated with the sharing of intentions
(Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007).
By definition, the deontic value of an action relates to
expectations that lie in the counterfactual depth of a typical
other’s generative model: e.g., when one is alone at 4 AM at
the red traffic light and engages in perspective taking to figure
out whether one should cross the street or not. Interestingly,
simulations of neural hermeneutics – namely, inferring an
intended meaning – suggest that expectations encoded by
generative models converge when engaging active inference in
communicative setting; e.g., two artificial birds singing to each
other by using the same generative model of birdsong (i.e.,
narrative) (Friston and Frith, 2015).
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While neural hermeneutics with simple generative models
of artificial birds may be fairly straightforward, in humans,
inferring another’s intentions and selecting adequate policies – as
a function of interpersonal and recursively nested expectations –
must be much more computationally costly (e.g., take more
time and energy). Yet, more often than not, we manage to
automatically select consensual policies that lead to those actions
that are expected by typical agents, even in time-pressured
contexts. How is it that we manage to tune ourselves to such a
complex nesting of expectations about an ‘ideal’ other, even when
no other agent is around?
By relying on the environment to learn pro-socially optimal
policies, agents save on computational cost (i.e., complexity)
as the environment carries expectations about oneself and
others’ expectations (Constant et al., 2018a,b). For instance,
by constraining the action possibilities of pedestrians, drivers,
and cyclists, the red traffic light indicates the behavior that
both me and my fellow denizens are most likely to select.
If I now incorporate this experience-dependent prior into my
generative model, I have a way of automatically selecting
policies that people ‘like me’ pursue; thereby minimizing my
uncertainty (i.e., expected free energy). The idea here is that it
is sufficient to use predictions about ‘how I would behave’ to
explain ‘how you are behaving’; thereby finessing the infinite
recursion of meta-metallization. Deontic cues (e.g., traffic lights),
thus, effectively allows us to share a narrative, or ROE;
even when alone.
On this view, deontic value just is the value of action that can
be inferred directly from deontic cues. Mathematically, deontic
value corresponds to a direct likelihood mapping between
policies and observations that can be inferred automatically in
the presence of deontic cues, which function as a ‘cache’ encoded
by the environment emerging from agents repeated action. In
other words, expectations about ‘where I should go’ (epistemic
value), ‘what I should perceive’ (pragmatic value), and ‘what one
should do’ (deontic value) together constitute the architecture
of the ROE learnt in ontogeny (see Figure 2). ROEs, then, can
be viewed as guiding automatic social responses as a function
of the Deontic, Epistemic (state), Epistemic (parameters), and
Pragmatic (DEEP) values of an action policy. The depth of the
DEEP model refers to the hierarchical depth of the generative
model; either in terms of model states of the world or time points
in the future (Table 1).
Modeling the Emergence of Deontic
Cues Under Active Inference
The ability of environmental cues to solicit, for instance, stopping
behavior at a red traffic light, rests on their epistemic value or
affordance and a particular kind of context invariance. Intuitively,
if a red traffic light could be turned to green whenever one
wanted to cross a road, it would have a fairly weak, if any,
influence on behavior (i.e., convey little deontic value). This
suggests that the epistemic authority of an environmental cue
(either artifactual, like a red traffic light, or human, like a traffic
officer), rests on the propensity of that cue to retain its epistemic
affordance when sampled.
Human agents pattern their environments, and in so
doing produce human and non-human cues that modulate an
agent’s foraging for socially relevant information (cf. cumulative
downstream epistemic engineering Sterelny, 2003; Tomasello,
2014). The relevance of deontic cues rests on the fact that they
consolidate (acquire potential for uncertainty reduction) as a
function of the collective activity of agents of a given community
(e.g., shared patterned cultural practice). Accordingly, we
propose that deontic cues in the human niche emerge through
the following circular causal process:
(i) Generic cues consolidate into deontic cues as a function of
agential action on the social environment, which entails the
structuring of inputs generated by the environment into a
community-specific local social world (Clark, 2006).
(ii) Deontic cues come to indicate socially salient action,
and to guide the agent’s active sampling of its world.
This in turn patterns attention toward responding to
deontic cues (i.e., informationally salient aspects of
the niche), thereby leading to further active sampling
consolidating deontic cues.
Generic Cues Consolidate Into Deontic
Cues Through Agential Actions on the
Environment
As for the likelihood matrix of the generative model introduced
in Figure 1, the generative process can be parameterized with
a Dirichlet distribution. Each location contains a value for each
possible sensory state (e.g., green and red), whose ‘redness’
and ‘greenness’ can be made more or less resistant to change
(in the sense mentioned above). The robustness, or ability
to resist changing as a function of agents’ actions can be
modeled by increasing the concentration parameters of the
Dirichlet distribution (as with the likelihood matrix of the
generative model).
Effectively, this means that the environment will have to
experience many instances of a particular combination of
states and outcomes before the Dirichlet distribution changes.
Technically, concentration parameters can be regarded as
the number of events encountered and therefore determines
the precision or robustness of the distribution in question.
For simplicity, we will refer to concentration parameters as
counts. On this view, the relative likelihood of an outcome
is just the associated count, normalized by the sum of
counts over all outcomes and the precision corresponds to
the sum of counts.
This property of the deontic value means that one can
treat it as an environmentally induced prior over policies
that, unlike epistemic and pragmatic value, is invariant to
contextual uncertainty or prior preferences. The environmental
cue eliciting deontic value has a special property that it resists
change when sampled. Hence, the environment offers these
cues robustly or with precision. Because the count of the
expectations (i.e., prior) in the generative matrix determines the
relative probability of outcomes at each location, as the agent
encounters a location, the environment will effectively learn the
actions selected, on average, by agents. As a result, navigation
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FIGURE 2 | Deontic cues. In contrast to the epistemic and pragmatic value, the deontic value is specified directly by the observations currently at hand. In other
words, it enables the agent to infer the best course of action quickly and efficiently based upon the information afforded by deontic cues. In sum, the deontic value of
a policy depends on deontic cues, which are generated by the environment, and once learnt, constrain policy selection. However, the propensity of the environment
to generate deontic cues itself depends upon the agent’s behavior. This circular causality brings something important to the table; namely, the ‘caching’ of beliefs
about action in the environment; in particular, actions that were originally selected after observation were made and policies selected, for their epistemic and
pragmatic value. Furthermore, because this ‘cache’ is shared by all agents that navigate the econiche, it enables a vicarious communication among agents, as the
environment ‘learns’ about the creatures that shape it.
will tend to move the expectations of the environment toward
agents’ preferences.
Accordingly, when acted upon by multiple agents, deontic
cues will move the expectations of the environment toward
shared preferences; i.e., the preferences of the local community.
Indeed, since the propensity of the generative matrix to change
(i.e., its robustness) can also be modeled as the sum of
concentration parameters at a location (i.e., prior precision),
the more agents act on the environment, the more robust
the cue will become; i.e., the higher the sum total of counts
will be. The higher the total count, the less the environmental
expectation changes as a function of an encounter with
the agent, and consequently, the more likely the agent is
to learn the value of the location and thereby sensitize its
behavior to the deontic cues (i.e., update its action selection
accordingly)2.
In this construction, deontic cues are high-fidelity cues from
which agents learn, and according to which they structure
their behavior. In cultural contexts, this suggests that the
deontic structure of the environment (which comprises other
2To model changes in the generative process as a function of the agent’s activity,
one can implement an update rule for the locations. For instance, the update
rule could be that for each encounter, the count of a preferred outcomes
increases while the count of an undesired one remains unchanged, or even
decreases, e.g., increasing the count of the green state and keeping that of the
red state the same (for details see, and the MATLAB code and demo routines
detailing the generative model of spatial navigation, which are available in the
niche construction demo DEM Toolbox of the SPM open source software:
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).
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TABLE 1 | DEEP model of ROEs.
Axiology Description
Deontic (external) The (shared) value of policy endowed
by a direct policy-outcome mapping,
indicating ‘what one should do if?’
Deontic value: ln P(pi|oτ) = ln P(oτ|pi)+ ln P(pi)
Deontic cue: P(oi | sτ) = αi∑
k αk
The deontic value is the direct likelihood of a policy given a particular outcome
or cue. It corresponds to a likelihood term in the posterior beliefs about policies
expressed in terms of likelihood and empirical prior, where the empirical prior
just is the expected free energy (−ln P(pi)=G). Referring to the generative model in
Figure 1, one could imagine an arrow that goes directly from policies to a
subset of outcomes, which reliably induce the policy (i.e., that bypass the
optimization of beliefs about states, hence the direct mapping). In turn, the
deontic cue is the probability of an outcome at any given state, which depends
upon concentration parameters α that the environment learns as a function of
how agents act on the world, which changes the value of the concentration
parameters.
Epistemic (parameters)
Epistemic (states) (internal)
The salience or information gain under
a given policy, with respect to ‘where I
should be if.’
EQ˜[lnQ(A)− lnA(oτ, sτ,pi)]
EQ˜[lnQ(sτ|pi)− lnQ(oτ,pi)]
The expected uncertainty reduction with respect to the states that would
generate observations. It captures the information gain expected by observing
an outcome (this is also the mutual information between expected outcomes
and their causes). Epistemic value can be decomposed into two terms: (i) the
information gain for parameters (i.e., novelty), and (ii) the information gain for
states (i.e., salience). This corresponds to the ‘information seeking’ dimension
of behavior.
Pragmatic (internal) The expected value of an outcome with
respect to ‘what I should perceive if.’
−EQ˜[lnP(oτ)] :
Q˜ = Q(oτ, sτ,A|pi)
The cost of engaging a given policy with respect to preferred outcomes. It
drives the ‘goal seeking’ aspect of behavior.
agents, like the traffic officer, as well as non-human ‘agents’
like traffic lights) contextualizes action selection (Ramstead
et al., 2016; van Dijk and Rietveld, 2016). Deontic cues thereby
guide action toward the disambiguation of future states of
the world; e.g., when you are at the intersection, and wonder
whether the stationary car will remain stationary, you rely on
the traffic light (i.e., its deontic value) to select your action
accordingly. This means that an environmental cue will be
deontic only in so far as agents ‘act out’ preferences (e.g., the
red traffic light affording stopping, and the agent’s preference
for stopping on the red). Put another way, deontic cues
acquire the ability to solicit pragmatic and epistemic habits
(Friston et al., 2016).
Deontic Cues Flag Salient Action and
Pattern Attention
The ROEs structures appraisals and automatic behavior
upstream, via constraints on possible actions flagged by
deontic cues in the generative process, and downstream,
via policy selection within the generative model. Upstream
constraints exist at the highest spatiotemporal scales of
the architecture of expectations, in the sense that they are
spatially extended (e.g., material setting vs. brain-based
architectures), and change slowly, as they require the physical
action of multiple agents (e.g., niche construction outcomes
that emerge over hours and years vs. changes in neural
connectivity that can change over milliseconds and seconds).
This means that the higher levels of a ROE are more robust,
as their physical implementation retains the traces of agents’
action over longer time scales. This allows for deontic cues
encoded in the environment to be passed over generation
via ecological and informational inheritance (Odling-Smee
and Laland, 2011), and thereby allow the reproduction of
attention, or epistemic foraging styles over ontogeny by shaping
observations and states of the world encoded in an agent’s
generative model.
From the point of view of active inference, one can distinguish
two aspects of attention: namely, salience and precision (Parr and
Friston, 2017). In the setting of policy selection, salience refers to
the epistemic value or affordance of an action; i.e., the uncertainty
reduction afforded by performing an action that may not have
immediate pragmatic value, such as flipping a light switch to
illuminate a room. When visual salience is high, a saccade will
be elicited, for instance. In other words, our visual foraging
or palpation is attracted to locations in the visual scene that
afford the greatest information gain or resolution of uncertainty.
In this setting, this salience is often referred to as Bayesian
surprise. The other aspect of attention relates to learning (i.e.,
perceptual inference). Learning is modulated by the confidence
put on sensory information (i.e., precision), which scores the
extent to which a given sensory input is weighted as reliable or
trusted; and is thought to be implemented by neuronal gain (for
a comprehensive review, see Hohwy, 2013).
Although both components of attention are related, under
active inference, they are clearly distinct. For instance, the
selection of a location for a visual saccade (relating to salience and
uncertainty reduction) is clearly distinct from the ‘downstream’
processing of the information made available by that saccade
(relating to learning). One could consider the sort of attention
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associated with a more precise influence of deontic cues on
policy selection as a more precise influence of sensory cues on
belief updating.
The notion of ROE integrates those functions attributed to
attention in relation to social cognition; namely, by providing a
mathematical framework for modeling epistemic foraging styles,
or what have been called ‘regimes of attention’ (Ramstead et al.,
2016; Veissière, 2016). The notion of regime of attention is a
cousin notion to the notion of ROE. Regimes of attention refer to
a shared style of allocating attentional resources that characterizes
a given cultural group; it marks certain information channels as
especially reliable, leading to increase in neuronal gating allocated
to that channel, and others not.
In the present setting, this attentional aspect reflects the
mapping between deontic cues and value learned through
action. Regimes of attention enable one to learn the epistemic
value afforded by deontic cues, thereby relating epistemic
value to attention. As the agent learns the epistemic value
of a deontic cue, the deontic cue will elicit the action
(e.g., an eye saccade) expected to most disambiguate the
situation (e.g., saccade toward the gesture of the traffic
officer), which will in turn elicit adaptive action (e.g.,
stopping), thereby consolidating the deontic cue (e.g., the
officer gaining confidence in the ability of its gesture to
elicit stopping).
THE ROLE OF REGIMES OF
EXPECTATIONS IN SOCIAL
CONFORMITY AND HUMAN DECISION
MAKING
The model on offer in this paper describes candidate mechanisms
of automatized behavior that obtains via the learning of culturally
specified deontic constraints. In our model, those mechanisms
are the optimization of epistemic and pragmatic value of action
and the consolidation of deontic cues in the environment. These
cues pattern attention and, in return, steer the learning of the
epistemic value afforded by deontic cues, and consequently action
selection. In the remainder of this paper, we explore the manner
in which our model resonates with phenomena related to social
conformity and decision making in humans.
Crucially, we are not claiming that the aforementioned
mechanisms necessarily results in decision making. Rather, based
on key findings in the literature, we sketch a view on how these
mechanisms may contribute to an explanation of certain features
of social conformity and human decision making.
Social Conformity From the Point of View
of ROEs
In the introduction, we saw that social psychologists have defined
the construct of social conformity as deference to the socially
approved norms as one possible response to social influence;
whereas cultural evolutionists have cast it as an adaptive learning
strategy that allows individuals to zero in on locally adaptive
behavior. These two perspectives on social conformity may be
viewed as emphasizing two equally important dimensions of
social conformity; respectively, the manner in which external
social influence generates conformity, and the manner in
which social conformity provides an adaptive advantage in
certain environments.
Following Morgan and Laland (2012), views in social
psychology and cultural evolution seem to intersect over the
notion of information foraging as a drive for social conformity.
The Asch experiment (Asch, 1955) is a standard experiment
to study social conformity, which shows that under certain
conditions, individuals can willingly defer to the group norm
even in perceptual decision-making tasks (e.g., comparing and
discriminating the size of visual targets). In Deutsch and Gerard’s
(Deutsch and Gerard, 1955) variant of the Asch experiment,
in which the streams of social influence were manipulated, the
tendency to defer to group norm (normative influence) alone
did not account for social conformity. There was an additional
component that related to information foraging. As Deutsch and
Gerard put it:
even if [one is] not normatively influenced, [one] may be influenced
by the others in the sense that the judgments of others are taken
to be a more or less trustworthy source of information about the
objective reality with which he and the others are confronted.
It is not surprising that the judgments of others [. . .] should be
taken as evidence to be weighed in coming to one’s own judgment.
From birth on, we learn that the perceptions and judgments of
others are frequently reliable sources of evidence about reality
(Deutsch and Gerard, 1955).
The results of Deutsch and Gerard suggest that conformity
is driven both by a utility maximizing component with respect
to other people’s approval (the normative component), and a
component based on the disposition to zero in on the correct
solution by seeking information (the informational component).
The informational component amounts to disambiguating one’s
alternative interpretations by leveraging others’ interpretations,
when they are deemed reliable. The balancing out of the utility
maximizing (pragmatic) and information seeking (epistemic)
value in action selection is precisely what drives an active
inference agent’s behavior. In the variant of the Asch experiment,
the deontic value is not made explicit, and might instead result
from the ‘innate’ tendency to align one’s beliefs to that of
trusted others, which come to signal highly reliable sources of
information; i.e., come to function as deontic cues.
In effect, others and the deontic cues they produce are, more
often than not, reliable sources of information that human learn
to leverage over developmental and evolutionary timescales.
While humans innately possess attentional biases to detect cues
signaling health, vulnerability and status (Henrich, 2015; for a
review, see Tomasello, 2014), many (though not all) cues will
acquire stable deontic status within a particular group over
development (e.g., learning to recognize specific symbols on a
police uniform, or forms of dress denoting lower and higher
socio-economic status).
The cultural evolutionary perspective on social conformity
focuses on the study of conformity, operationalized as a learning
rule that heavily relies on the acquisition of social information.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 679
fpsyg-10-00679 April 1, 2019 Time: 14:22 # 10
Constant et al. Active Inference in Social Life
In our model, one candidate mechanism whereby social learning
obtains is via the attribution and leveraging of peoples and things’
deontic value. Deontic cues are a type of social information (i.e.,
information about community specific preferences outsourced to
states of the niche).
Cultural evolutionary approaches seek to disentangle the
effects of social learning (conveyed by demonstrators) and asocial
learning (performed by individuals alone) to study the adaptive
value of conformist responses. For example, a study by Morgan
et al. (2012) found that the use of social information enhances
performance in an object comparison task, which suggests that
the use of social information is adaptive (cf. Javarone et al.,
2016). The same study found that subjects are more likely to
make a decision that is consistent with that of the majority, only
when the number of demonstrators reaches a certain number –
and when participants are uncertain of their own abilities
(conveyed by the probability that subjects change their decision).
This demonstration of the role of uncertainty in conformist
responses resonates with the observation that the adoption of
the majority’s behavior only obtains when the learner is naïve
(Boyd and Richerson, 1988).
These findings are consistent with our model, which views
conformity as the outcome of a dynamic process between
information seeking and preference tuning responses. Scenarios
wherein learners are naïve or uncertain – and wherein the
number of replicators is high – can be framed as scenarios where
the learners possess low confidence over prior beliefs concerning
the state of affair in the world, and wherein the deontic value
increases as a function of the increase in the precision of the
environment (i.e., increase in the number of counts relative to
the number of demonstrators performing the task).
Stable environments are by definition uninformative, in the
sense that they are fully learnt under the agent’s generative model.
Therefore, epistemic (i.e., informational) foraging will not be the
main driver of behavior in such settings. Rather, the agent will act
on the basis of her preferences (i.e., acting pragmatically), and will
not learn from environmental cues. The process of conformity
kicks in when the agent initially possesses imprecise beliefs about
their environment, and therefore seeks to disambiguate her prior
expectations about what sort of place she is operating in. In
foraging for information, the agent will encounter deontic cues,
the epistemic value of which she can learn, and which nuance her
action selection.
Comparison to a Closely Related
Computational Model
An operational definition of social conformity based on the
theory of ROEs under active inference may be stated as follows:
social conformity is the state of affairs wherein the deontic value
reifies the epistemic and pragmatic value of action relative to the
preferences of a given cultural group embodied in deontic cues.
Social conformity, therefore, may be viewed as a developmental
process that obtains via deontic constraints over the learning of
expectations that structure available action possibilities.
The view we offer in this paper is close in spirit to
Toelch and Dolan (2015) formulation of informational and
normative influences on social conformity in perceptual and
value-based decision-making. Toelch and Dolan consider
the process of perceptual decision making under social
influence, casting perceptual decision making as the process
of estimating environmental parameters through hierarchical
Bayes (Mathys et al., 2011). In this setting, agents refine
their estimations about the precision (i.e., inverse volatility) of
environmental fluctuations. In Toelch and Dolan’s formulation,
norms then guide behavior, in the sense that they come
to influence the learning of precision parameters, thereby
biasing perceptual decision making. In this setting ‘precision’
corresponds to ‘counts’ above, while ‘patterning of attention’
corresponds to what Toelch and Dolan call the ‘modulating of
learning rate.’
Our model is consistent with Toelch and Dolan’s commitment
to Bayesian inference and (precision or volatility) learning as
an explanation for the influence of social norms. We go a step
further by proposing that the emergence of deontic cues could
account for some forms of norm formation, and that norms can
be modeled in terms of ‘precision,’ though, on the side of the
environment constructed by ‘people like us.’
Deontic cues emphasize the interplay between the formation
of perceptual estimates of environmental parameters as described
by Toelch and Dolan, the selection of actions based on the
value of these estimates (among other things) that forms
the basis of the epistemic and pragmatic value of action,
and crucially, the looping or feedback influence of action
on environmental parameters. Put another way, our model
emphasizes the function of ‘salience’ (as opposed to precision,
or inverse variance) as an attribute of prior beliefs (i.e., the
estimates) influenced by deontic cues. What we call deontic
cues, then, may be viewed as external vehicles for norms. Hence,
the consolidation of deontic cues provides a rationale to model
the manner in which norms consolidate and contribute to
social conformity.
As things stand, our model remains purely theoretical. Careful
experiments and simulation work will be needed to establish
whether social influences in experimental settings, such as the
Asch experiment, indeed stem from the effect of deontic cues.
ROEs and Human Decision Making?
It is well-known in the empirical study of reasoning and
decision-making in humans that models emphasizing the
optimization of individual utility and competition between
individuals – the so-called Machiavellian intelligence
hypothesis (Barkow et al., 1995; Pinker, 1999; Dunbar,
2009) – do not explain the full range of observed
reasoning and decision-making in humans. While human
decision-making conforms to some canons of rationality
[e.g., they mostly conform to the law of demand, and
as the cost of fairness increases, people tend to do it
less (Anderson and Putterman, 2006)]; other empirical
investigations suggest that human cognition is optimized
for cooperation through the sharing information with, and
outsourcing of decision-making and policy selection to,
other relevant human agents and cues in the environment
(Henrich, 2015; Mercier and Sperber, 2017; for a review,
see Tomasello, 2014).
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The Ultimatum Game is a prime example of the propensity of
human to outsource decision-making to third parties (Ensminger
and Henrich, 2014). The game is about a monetary prize to be
split amongst two players. The task of the first participant is
to propose a proportion to share the winnings – say, splitting
them 50–50; the task of the second player consists in accepting or
rejecting this offer; this player’s role is crucial, for if they accept,
the winnings are divided along the first player’s suggestion;
otherwise, no winnings are distributed. From the point of view of
classical economic theory, Nash equilibrium is for the first player
to make a small offer (which maximizes individual utility), and
for the second to accept anything offered – since something is
better than nothing.
The comparisons of cognitive performance are striking in
economic games between species. Unlike chimpanzees, human
beings operate under the rubric of a ‘fairness psychology’ – a
feature which makes them remarkably suboptimal at economic
games that use the maximization of individual utility as a
metric for success. Chimpanzees perform at Nash equilibrium;
but humans, strikingly, do not; e.g., human players have
a marked propensity to reject offers as the split departs
from equality (Jensen et al., 2007; Prize et al., 2013). This
makes little sense under the assumption that human beings
are individual maximizers; but makes perfect sense if human
beings instead tend to rely on third parties, to which they’ve
learned to ascribe salience to support cooperation, and punish
uncooperative behavior. On our model, this follows from the fact
that the human social conformity becomes cooperative via the
outsourcing of epistemic value, and is modulated by deontic cues
(e.g., other agents).
In the 1960s it was found that human beings tend to
reason by finding justifications for what they already believe –
a phenomenon dubbed confirmation bias (Wason, 1960;
Nickerson, 1998), but which is more accurately described as
myside bias (Mercier and Sperber, 2017). In Wason’s famous card
selection task, subjects are presented with four cards, each side of
which has a number and a latter. The task consists in identifying
which cards one must flip over in order to verify whether a given
rule obtains (for example, ‘If there is an E on one side of the card,
then there is a 2 on the other side of the card’). Human subjects
do not seem to apply rules of inference; they seem to indicate the
cards that are mentioned in the prompt. Only 10–20% of subjects
respond correctly. Participants are much more likely to succeed
in ‘isomorphic thematic’ versions of the task, that is, versions that
map thematic rules over the logical rule.
Interestingly, human logical reasoning is optimized when
(i) subjects are allowed to reason in groups – with success in
performance rising from ∼20%, up to around 80% (Mercier and
Sperber, 2017); and (ii), when the reasoning task is contextualized
with less abstract or purely logical rules (e.g., If red, then stop,
instead of If E then 2) – known as the content effect (Wason
and Shapiro, 1971). Wason and Shapiro (Wason and Shapiro,
1971) hypothesized that increased relevance, operationalized by
using terms relating to individuals’ experience, eases symbolic
manipulation and reasoning. The optimization of cognitive
performance and reasoning via the reliance on deontic cues (e.g.,
other humans and artifacts or representations that contextualize
the task) can explain this observation. By outsourcing epistemic
value to contextual deontic cues (context or others), one saves on
computational cost of policy selection (Constant et al., 2018b),
which eases decision making by allowing the agent to base
its decision on robust regularities that pertain to one’s learned
expectations relative to one’s social setting.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a normative model of ROEs (cf. Table 1.),
which are typically used to explain human social conformity and
decision making. We have attempted an explanation of how such
architectures take hold in ontogeny, and how they are reproduced
over generations. Finally, we have argued that social conformity
could be defined as a state of affairs in which the value of action –
evaluated under deep internal models – is cached or outsourced
to an external, deontic level, and that human decision-making
could be viewed as highly dependent on the reliance on those
deontic cues and values.
Our model of ROEs may be of interest for more empirically-
minded domains of research that study human culture and
cognition. For instance, in health sciences, cultural psychiatry
attempts to frame mental health in cultural terms; namely,
by studying the influence of representations, symbols, artifacts,
and culturally patterned practices on pathological behavior
and psychiatric practice (for a comprehensive review, see
Bhugra and Bhui, 2018). Our model may provide the basis for
developing behavioral and cognitive markers of social integration
on the background of which mental health diagnoses and
treatments are performed.
Future research could address important, outstanding
problems that relate to our model, such as how to model the
specificity of expectations embodied in different environmental
factors; e.g., how to study the distinction between the red traffic
light, a parent, a religious artifact, etc. One putative consequence
of our model, which could be pursued in future research, is the
idea that the deontic value of action does not depend merely
on isolated external cues, but often on an ecology of cues, which
together form complex sets of expectations; e.g., the pattern of
green, yellow, and red traffic lights, together with urban design of
the intersection, pedestrian and cars, traffic laws and police, etc.
Accordingly, the notion of regime of expectations may provide
new computational schemes and strategies for fields such as
cognitive ecology (Hutchins, 1995, 2010, 2014) and embodied
and extended cognitive science (Clark and Chalmers, 1998;
Chemero, 2009; Menary, 2010; Sutton, 2010; Kirchhoff, 2012); it
is also relevant to areas of research like interactive design (Kirsh,
2013). Those fields study cognition as distributed over internal
(e.g., brain) and external (e.g., environmental) processes, by
offering an understanding of how action, perception, attention,
and social learning in humans are structured in and around the
epistemic niche (Clark, 2006).
A key question to further explore is how epistemic
styles afforded by specific niches are inherited from one
generation to the next, and how they can be finessed over
ontogeny. Future research could relate our model to phenomena
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such as cumulative cultural evolution (Henrich, 2015) and
cultural inheritance (Odling-Smee and Laland, 2011); especially
in terms of epistemic power and epistemic authority such
as vehicled by deontic cues. Future projects of ours include
simulations of multiple interacting agents with different
preferences and different generative process, to examine how
patterned behavior emerges through collective actions on
the environment. This will allow our model to be tested
against behavioral data acquired, e.g., in navigation task in
virtual environment.
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GLOSSARY
Concept Definition
Regime of expectations Set of expectations that structure action with respect to deontic, epistemic, and pragmatic values.
Deontic cue Cues that induce behavior that remains unchanged over time, through reiterated action in the environment, while in turn being
induced and maintained by the agent’s repeated actions in the environment.
Social conformity under active
inference
The state of affairs wherein the deontic value comes to dominate policy selection and preferences in action and decision-making in
a given cultural group. It obtains via the deontic constraints over the learning of expectations that, in turn, structure the available
possibilities for action (i.e., epistemic and pragmatic value, or affordance).
Human decision-making Unique propensity to rely on cooperative biases and to outsource policy selection to third parties (e.g., material or human cues).
Active inference Process whereby agents garner Bayesian model evidence for their prior expectations about the world they inhabit. Technically,
active inference entails the selection of action sequences that minimize expected free energy; i.e., minimize expected surprise
(uncertainty) or, equivalently, maximize expected model evidence.
Prior expectations Probability distribution over hidden states prior to observations.
Generative model A joint probability distribution over environmental states and subsequent observations – usually specified in terms of prior
expectations (about states) and the likelihood of observations given states. The generative model is a probabilistic model of the
generative process.
Generative process The actual process generating (observable) outcomes from (unobservable) states of the world.
Bayesian model evidence Probability of observations given the generative model (i.e., independent of environmental states), known as the integrated or
marginal likelihood (because one integrates or marginalizes over states of the model). The negative logarithm of model evidence is
also known as surprisal.
Expected free energy Functional of counterfactual expectations about states that comprise the epistemic, pragmatic, and deontic value of a policy. It
quantifies the propensity of a policy to minimize expected surprise (a.k.a. surprisal or self-information) – or maximize expected
Bayesian model evidence – in the future.
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